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ABSTRACT
In 2009, Florida became the first U.S. jurisdiction to
articulate a Character and Fitness Evaluation (CFE)
policy of examining the social media accounts of bar
applicants who had demonstrated a history of questionable
conduct such as substance abuse or seeking to violently
overthrow the U.S. government. This policy may allow
access to otherwise legally inaccessible data, which creates
a risk of the bar unlawfully considering information
protected by applicants’ constitutional rights. Over the past
60 years, the U.S. Supreme Court has split on whether bar
organizations may constitutionally deny bar admission to
applicants who refuse to answer certain questions on this
basis. This Article proposes that bars should publish (1) the
types of traits an applicant must demonstrate to succeed on
a CFE; (2) the types of conduct that may warrant further
inquiry and eventually lead to an unsuccessful CFE; (3)
criteria for evaluating suspect conduct; and (4) the types of
information gathered on applicants’ social media accounts
that may not be considered by the bar.
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INTRODUCTION
The increasing use of social media such as Facebook and
Twitter by the legal community poses ethical questions for the
state bar associations that monitor lawyer conduct. Members of the
legal community have written extensively on the expectations for
professional use of social media by attorneys and warned that
violation of rules of professional conduct through online behavior
will result in disciplinary actions. 1 However, bar associations have
1

See, e.g., Diana Dearmin, Lawyers Tweeting, Blogging, and IMing — Oh
My! Potential Ethical Pitfalls Under the RPCs, WASH. STATE BAR NEWS
(Seattle, WA), April 2010, at 29-31; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-457 (2010) (discussing how rules of professional
conduct regarding advertising and creation of attorney-client relationship
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generally not articulated how the online conduct of candidates
seeking admission to the bar will impact admission decisions.
In 2009, Florida became the first jurisdiction to announce a
policy of requesting access to a bar applicant’s social media
accounts when a candidate demonstrated questionable moral
conduct. Commentators have split on the amount and types of
information that a bar association should and may constitutionally
consider from an applicant’s social media accounts.
This Article proposes applicants’ constitutional rights will be
best protected by published character and fitness evaluation (CFE)
policies regarding social media that specify what information bar
examiners may not consider. Section I will provide a brief
background on the current use of social media as well as the nature
of CFEs. Section II will explore the Florida State Bar
Association’s character and fitness evaluation as well as the State’s
social media policy. Section III will discuss U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence on CFEs and how it could be applied to CFE social
media policies. Finally, Section IV will critique current arguments
regarding CFE social media policies and propose a new standard.
I. BACKGROUND
The Internet has become a way of life and people increasingly
use social media to connect with friends, network, and create a
professional identity. As many as 75 percent of American adults
between the ages of 18 and 24 have profiles on social media sites,
while 57 percent of those between 25 and 34 use social networking
sites. 2
Attorneys are increasingly establishing a presence for
themselves online: firms have websites and social media accounts;
online organizations rank and evaluate attorneys; and individual
through websites); see also N.M. Bar, Advisory Op. 2001-1 (2001) (applying
New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct to attorneys’ use of listserve-type
message boards).
2
Memorandum from Amanda Lenhart on adults and social network
websites (Jan. 14. 2009) (on file with Pew Internet & American Life Project
Website at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2009/PIP
_Adult_social_networking_data_memo_FINAL.pdf.pdf).
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attorneys use social media activity for both personal and
professional purposes. 3 Like attorneys, law students also engage
with social media.
A. Predicting Law Students’ Use of Social Media Based on
Existing Studies of Medical Students’ Use of Social Media
Although numerous articles and disciplinary cases discuss the
types of unprofessional conduct exhibited by attorneys through
social media, there are no studies demonstrating the types of
unprofessional online conduct exhibited by law students. However,
various studies have examined the types of unprofessional conduct
exhibited by medical students on their social media accounts. 4
Medical students, like law students, are expected to adhere to their
profession’s ethical code even as students. With respect to social
behavior, there is not reason to expect law students to behave
differently than medical students. Therefore, bar associations will
likely discover similar types of unprofessional conduct as those
currently found on medical students’ social media accounts.
A 2009 study of the use of social media by medical students
indicated that 60 percent of medical schools studied had incidents
of unprofessional online conduct. 5 The study revealed that: 13
percent of schools reported violations of patient confidentiality, 52
percent of schools reported use of profanity, 48 percent reported
discriminatory language, 39 percent reported depictions of
intoxication, and 38 percent had incidents of sexually suggestive
material. 6 In response to such behaviors, 30 of 45 schools reporting
3

Kathleen Elliott Vison, The Blurred Boundaries of Social Networking in
the Legal Field: Just “Face” It, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 355 (2010).
4
See, e.g., H.M. Swick, P. Szenas, D. Danoff, & M.E. Whitcomb.
Teaching Professionalism in Undergraduate Medical Education. 282 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N. 830 (1999); A. Kao, M. Lim, J. Spevick, & B. Barzansky,
Teaching and Evaluating Students’ Professionalism in US Medical Schools,
2002-2003, 290 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 1151 (2003); Katherine C. Chretien, S.
Ryan Greysen, Jean-Paul Chretien, & Terry Kind, Online Posting of
Unprofessional Content by Medical Students, 302 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 1309
(2009).
5
Chretien et. al., supra note 4, at 1311.
6
Id.
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incidents gave informal warnings, while three dismissed students
for their online behavior. 7 Other studies reached similar
conclusions. 8 Though law students’ online behavior will not
exactly resemble that of medical students, these studies suggest the
types of unprofessional conduct that law students may engage in
through their social media accounts. It seems strange that bar
organizations do not even have a policy as to whether bar
applicants’ online behavior will be evaluated pending admission to
the bar, because (1) bar organizations expect attorneys’ online
behavior to adhere to the professional rules of conduct, and (2)
data based on medical students suggest law students likely exhibit
some unprofessional conduct online.
B. Character and Fitness Evaluations
Each potential lawyer must undergo a CFE as part of a
jurisdiction’s bar admission process to become a licensed
attorney. 9 The CFE component exists to protect the public and the
system of justice from unethical individuals. 10 Although the
Comprehensive Guide to Bar Admission Requirements 2011
recommends that each bar publish its character and fitness
standards, 18 of 56 jurisdictions had not done so as of 2011. 11
In the majority of jurisdictions, a successful candidate must
demonstrate good moral character by proving that he or she is
honest, trustworthy, and diligent. 12 Evidence of questionable
conduct triggers further inquiry. 13 Bar candidates are afforded due
7

Id.
See Swick et. al., supra note 4, at 830-32; Kao et. al., supra, at 1151-52.
9
NAT’L. CONF. OF BAR EXAMINERS & THE AMER. BAR ASS’N. SEC. OF
LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, Comprehensive Guide to Bar
Admission Requirements 2011 viii (Erica Moeser & Claire Huismann eds.,
Nat’l. Conf. of Bar Examiners & the Amer. Bar Ass’n 2011) (noting that the
CFE is administered by a body responsible to the court and independent of the
bar association).
10
Id. at vii.
11
Id. at 16 (noting the rules should be applied consistently as well).
12
Id. at viii.
13
Id. (summarizing 56 jurisdictions’ relevant conduct as unlawful conduct,
academic misconduct, making of false statements, acts involving dishonesty,
8
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process via notice and the opportunity to appear with an attorney
before an adverse ruling is made regarding a CFE. 14
Bar applicants must respond honestly to all CFE committee
requests for information, and may fail the CFE if not completely
candid in their responses. 15 Applicants may claim constitutional
privileges under the First and Fourteen Amendments in response to
the bar’s improper requests for constitutionally protected
information. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a
state’s compelling interest to ensure attorneys—as officers of the
court—have proper character and fitness may trump applicants’
constitutional rights in certain cases. 16
II. FLORIDA’S SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY
The Florida bar is the first and only association to adopt a
policy on how an applicant’s online presence may be examined
during a CFE. This policy could form the basis for other states’
policies, although differences in underlying CFE requirements
could require substantial tailoring of such policies.

fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation abuse of legal process, neglect of financial
responsibilities, neglect of professional obligations, violation of an order of a
court, evidence of mental or emotional instability, evidence of drug or alcohol
dependency, denial of admission to the bar in another jurisdiction on character
and fitness grounds, and disciplinary action by a lawyer disciplinary agency or
other professional disciplinary agency of any jurisdiction).
14
Id.
15
See, e.g., Lane v. Bar Comm’n of the Neb. State Bar Ass’n, 544 N.W.2d
367 (Neb. 1996) (denying an applicant admission to the bar for not being
completely candid when responding to bar application and CFE committee
questions though the applicant did not intend to deceive the committee); Greene
v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 4 Cal. 3d 189, 201 (1971) (denying an
applicant admission to the bar because he knowingly made material
misstatements on his bar applicant and to the CFE committee).
16
Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 56 (1961) (Konigsberg II);
Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc., et al., v. Lowell Wadmond,
401 U.S. 154 (1971).
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A. Florida’s Character and Fitness Evaluation
Florida’s published CFE standards state that a successful
applicant must satisfactorily demonstrate general fitness to practice
law, knowledge of the professional standards, and good moral
character, including trustworthiness, honesty, and diligence. 17 The
Florida rules state that any conduct that reflects adversely on an
applicant’s character may warrant further inquiry. 18 The bar
association does not specify any types of information that it will
not consider because the data is not reasonably related to the
practice of law or constitutionally impermissible to consider, such
as an applicant’s sexual orientation or religious beliefs and
practices. 19
B. Florida’s Social Media Policy
In 2009, the Florida Board of Bar Examiners adopted a policy
of investigating the social networking accounts of only those
applicants with certain questionable backgrounds on a case-bycase basis. 20 In such cases, applicants would be required to submit
17

Rules of the Supreme Court Relating to Admission to the Bar, 2-12 Proof
of Character and Fitness (Jan. 3, 2011),
http://www.floridabarexam.org/public/main.nsf/rules.html#1-14 (last visited
Sept. 25, 2012).
18
Id.
19
Compare with Washington Admission to Practice Rule 24.2 (e) Factors
Not Considered When Determining Character & Fitness,
http://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/?fa=court_rules.display&group=ga&set=
APR&ruleid=gaapr24.2 (last visited Sept. 25, 2012) (listing factors not
considered, including: racial or ethnic identity; sex; sexual orientation; religious
or spiritual beliefs or affiliation; and political beliefs or affiliation).
20
Florida Board of Bar Examiners re Consideration of the Fianl Report of
the Character and Fitness Commission, 5 (2009) (available at
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/pub_info/documents/2009_FBBE_Characte
r_Fitness_Response.pdf) (listing case-by-case social media inquiries may be
made for applicants with concerning conduct, such as those with “a history of
substance abuse/dependence, . . . significant candor concerns. . . and applicants
who have positively responded to Item 27 of the bar application (regarding
involvement in an organization advocating the overthrow of the government of
the United States or of any state or political subdivision)”).
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their user name and password for all of their social media
accounts. 21
Because this policy is published, the Board admits that
applicants “are likely to delete any derogatory material before staff
has the opportunity to review it.” 22 There are no published
opinions denying an applicant’s admission to the Florida Bar based
on information discovered on social media accounts during a CFE,
nor have there have been any published cases in which the Florida
bar examined an applicant’s social media activity. This raises the
question: did the Florida Bar Board only intend to raise awareness
about the need for online discretion by future attorneys?
C. Other States’ Social Media Policies
No other state has published a policy regarding use of social
media in bar admissions, although several have begun informal
discussions. 23 Other states may use Florida’s policy as a basis for
their own, as Florida’s rules would be easy and practical to adopt
because they are clearly stated and limited in scope.
III. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE OF CHARACTER
AND FITNESS EVALUATIONS
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently recognized the public
policy arguments in support of CFEs, while remaining concerned
that the vague definition of “good moral character” may allow
CFEs to “be a dangerous instrument for arbitrary and
discriminatory denial of the right to practice.” 24 This Article limits
21

Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 5.
23
Interview with Jean McElroy, Director of Regulatory Services, WASH.
STATE BAR ASS’N., in Seattle, Washington (October 14, 2011).
24
Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252 (1957) (Konigsberg I); see
also, Deborah Rhode, Moral Character As A Professional Credential, 94 Yale
L.J. 491, 497-502 (1985) (noting that State bars historically have excluded
women, Jews, those of Eastern European decent, religious fanatics,
Communists, and adulterers, among others, because these allegedly socially
unacceptable or radical political behaviors were said to have demonstrated a
propensity to violate professional norms).
22
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discussion of Supreme Court cases to those dealing with First
Amendment rights of freedom of belief and freedom of
association. 25
A. Black Letter Law
The Supreme Court has considered applicants’ absolute right to
freedom of belief to include their political philosophies and beliefs;
thus, the Court has generally granted absolute protection from bar
inquiry to applicant’s political philosophies or beliefs in CFEs. 26
However, the Court has remained divided over a series of cases as
to whether a state may constitutionally inquire into bar applicants’
prior memberships in political organizations. 27 The Court has held
that a state may constitutionally deny admission to an applicant
who refuses “to provide unprivileged answers to questions having
a substantial relevance to his qualifications,” even if the questions
relate to political beliefs otherwise protected by the First
Amendment. 28 In these instances however, the state bar association
must warn the applicant that refusal to answer may result in being
denied admission. 29 When bar associations provide no such
warning and the applicant has established proof of good moral
character, denial of bar admission for failure to answer questions
regarding political beliefs and prior political associations is
unconstitutional. 30 Further, state bar organizations violate
applicants’ right to freedom of association by requiring applicants

25

This Article only discusses U.S. Supreme Court cases regarding the rights
of freedom of belief and freedom of association, because these rights
predominately govern the types of information and extent of information that
bar organizations may constitutionally obtain from an applicant’s social media
accounts. Discussion of other federal constitutional rights and state
constitutional rights is beyond the scope of this Article.
26
See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
27
Whether state courts may interpret state constitutions to provide greater
protection of these rights is beyond the scope of this Article.
28
Konigsberg II, 366 U.S. at 44.
29
Id.
30
Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. at 724; see also In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 30
(1971).
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to list all organizations to which they have belonged since
beginning law school. 31
B. Applying Past Jurisprudence to Social Media
Given the Court’s previous five-to-four splits on cases
involving the constitutionality of CFEs, the U.S. Supreme Court is
likely to continue to split on cases regarding the constitutionality of
CFE inquiries involving social media.
The means of obtaining information from a social media
account differs significantly from the means used to obtain
information at issue in previous U.S. Supreme Court cases. In
those cases, information was obtained by direct examination of the
bar applicant, 32 editorials he had written, 33 and affidavits given to
third parties who knew the applicants. 34 In contrast to an interview
with the bar association, there is no clear means for an applicant to
refuse to provide certain information when the bar accesses the
applicant’s social media account(s). A third-party affidavit differs
from an applicant’s social media account in that the former is
written by a third party in response to specific questions proposed
by the bar association while the latter is written by the applicant of
his or her own accord. Also, the author of an affidavit swears to the
veracity of the document. 35 In contrast, an applicant may instead
intend a statement in social media as a joke, not to be taken
seriously or as true. Put simply, the difference is that when a bar
association accesses an applicant’s social media account it views a
record of comments, messages, and pictures previously created by
the applicant without understanding the context in which that
record was made. Yet, the information obtained on an applicant’s
31

In re Stolar, 401 U.S. at 28, 33 (holding applicants may not be forced to
disclose participation in groups seeking to over throw the U.S. government by
force, but the dissent argued States had a right to inquiry into an applicant’s
membership and willingness to participate in the forceful destruction of the
government, because the State was deciding whether to “vest great professional
and fiduciary power”).
32
Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. at 724-28; Konigsberg II, 366 U.S. at 47-50.
33
Id.
34
Wadmond, 401 U.S. 161-62.
35
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
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social media account(s) may provide the association valuable
insight into the applicant’s character. Due to the differences in how
information was obtained in prior Supreme Court cases compared
to how it may be obtained from applicant’s social media accounts,
these will likely be constitutional issues for future courts to
resolve.
Although there are many differences, the previous Supreme
Court cases offer some guidance on how courts may rule about bar
associations’ use of applicants’ social media accounts. The Court
may hold that an inquiry into an applicant’s social media account
is constitutional if it is tailored to gather information reasonably
related to an applicant’s qualifications and moral character as an
attorney. 36 The greatest issue that courts must resolve is whether
bar associations may require an applicant to provide access to his
or her social media account(s) in order to pass the CFE, or whether
applicants may refuse to provide such access and still pass the
CFE. If a bar association can require such access or deny
admission to the bar, then a court will probably require that
applicants be informed of this possibility. As in previous cases,
courts may balance the type of information that the bar association
seeks against an applicant’s constitutional right to freedom of
speech and association, which may be infringed upon by bar access
to the applicant’s social media account(s). 37 Because information
in social media accounts may be stored permanently, courts will
have to carefully consider how its rulings will impact others’ use
of social media as a form of free speech.
Further, courts must decide whether bar associations may
obtain otherwise constitutionally precluded information from
applicants’ social media accounts. For example, it is unclear
whether courts will permit bar associations to use information from
an applicant’s social media account(s) to obtain a history of the
applicant’s participation in political and religious organizations.
Bar associations may attempt to create a complete list of an
applicant’s previous memberships in political organizations in this
way because they are no longer allowed to simply ask for this
36
37

See generally Konigsberg II, 366 U.S. 36.
Id. at 51.
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information. 38 Courts will have to determine if attempting to obtain
a complete list of an applicant’s memberships in political
organizations is materially different than simply asking an
applicant to list all such memberships.
IV.

CURRENT PROPOSALS AND A NEW PROPOSAL FOR BAR
POLICIES ON SOCIAL MEDIA IN CFES
A. Current Scholarship

Commentators are split on which CFE policy adheres most
closely to constitutional requirements governing the use of
information gathered on applicants’ social media accounts in
CFEs. Because little has been written on this topic, this Article
discusses the three current proposals in legal scholarship
addressing the use of social media in CFEs. At one end, law
student Amy-Kate Roeder argues the Florida CFE policy is
unconstitutional, because it allows the bar access to information
that it could not legally request, such as religious status and sexual
orientation. 39 She argues that all jurisdictions should only consider
publicly available social media information—that is information
that is shown following a search for the user’s name, but not any
information protected by privacy settings. 40 Roeder’s proposed
policy would allow applicants to control information available in
CFEs by making decisions on their level of social media privacy in
light of the bar’s published policy.
In the middle, law student Dina Epstein argues that online
information should only be utilized when vetted by an impartial
third source, such as an applicant’s law school. 41 Epstein fears that
allowing the bar to act as “prosecutor, judge, and jury” leaves too
38

In re Stolar, 401 U.S. at 28, 33.
Amy-Kate Roeder, Wall Posts, Status Updates, and the Bar: How Social
Networking Impacts Character and Fitness Requirements, 35 J. LEGAL PROF.
145 (2010).
40
Id. at 154-55.
41
Dina Epstein, Note, Have I Been Googled?: Character and Fitness in the
Age of Google, Facebook and YouTube, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 715 (2008).
This article was published prior to Florida’s announcement of its social media
policy.
39
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much room for abuse, which is especially problematic as it is so
hard to distinguish “online fact from online fiction.” 42 She also
believes that clear rules regarding the evaluation of information
from an applicant’s social media use may ensure that applicants
feel free to engage in online legal discussions without fear of being
negatively impacted on their CFEs. 43
At the other end, Michelle Morris, a lecturer at the University
of Virginia Law School, argues that all online conduct by an
applicant should be available to the bar, including anonymous
postings. 44 Morris contends that her policy will force applicants to
“take credit (or blame) for their own words.” 45 Her arguments
were written primarily in response to online behavior that was
racist, sexist, and harmful to others, such as the website
Autoadmit.com, on which Yale law students have posted
anonymous offensive and humiliating comments about
classmates. 46 Morris’ position targets behaviors at the extremes,
which are unlikely to be exhibited by most candidates. However,
her proposal sweeps significantly more broadly than the behaviors
Morris sought to target and the bar association’s access to all
online conduct of applicants may create problems of its own.
In sum, Epstein, Roeder and Morris’ differing positions
demonstrate the breadth of debate regarding use of social media
accounts in CFE. Data gathered from applicants’ accounts may be
both under-inclusive and over-inclusive. Additionally, bar
organizations may be improperly and unconstitutionally utilizing
information that cannot legally be obtained through other means.

42

Id. at 727.
Id.
44
Michelle Morris, The Legal Profession, Personal Responsibility, and the
Internet, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 53 (2007).
45
Id.
46
Jonathan Sabin, Every Click You Make: How the Proposed Disclosure of
Law Students' Online Identities Violates Their First Amendment Right to Free
Association, 17 J.L. & POL'Y 699, 700 (2009) (noting that Morris was
particularly concerned with online behavior that was racist, sexist, and harmful
to others, such as the website Autoadmit.com, on which Yale law students have
posted anonymous offensive and humiliating comments about classmates).
43

120

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 8:2

B. A Proposal for Clarity in CFE Standards and Constitutional
Social Media Policies
In light of the above commentators’ proposals for a social
media policy in CFEs, this article proposes that jurisdictions
should adopt and publish clear social media policies for CFEs that
ensure applicants’ constitutional rights will be respected, while still
holding applicants responsible for information available publically
on their social media accounts. First and foremost, bars can adhere
most closely to the constitutional requirements by publishing the
standards by which applicants will be evaluated and the types of
traits an applicant must demonstrate to succeed on a CFE. This
approach may allow state supreme courts to review and approve
standards before they are formally adopted. Additionally, bars
should list the types of conduct that may warrant further inquiry
and eventually lead to an unsuccessful CFE. Further, bars should
state, at least generally, how the conduct of concern will be
evaluated. Finally, bars should explicitly note what types of
information gathered on applicants’ social media accounts may not
be considered by the bar.
Regardless of how much information the bar can access, there
are certain types of information that should not be considered by
the bar out of respect for applicants’ First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. First, information regarding an applicant’s
gender, sexual orientation, ethnic background and physical
disabilities should never be considered by the bar in order to
protect each applicant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to freedom
from discrimination. Second, the bar should be allowed to consider
evidence of applicants’ extremist political or religious beliefs and
associations that are suggested by social media conduct only when
corroborated by evidence from another source, such as a personal
interview. This method would be narrowly tailored to achieve the
state’s compelling interest of barring admission to an applicant
who specifically seeks to overthrow the U.S. government through
violent means or has a specific intent or has taken specific action to
incite racial hatred or “to carry out his life’s mission of depriving
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those he dislikes of their legal rights.” 47 Because comments on
social media sites may not have been written seriously or may have
been written by a third party, not the account owner, such
comments should not be sufficient evidence, standing alone, of an
applicant’s intentions to violently overthrow the U.S. government.
This recommendation may require that one employee of the bar
association screen an applicant’s social media account(s) and pass
on the CFE committee relevant evidence to assess a candidate;
however, this screening person would withhold any evidence
gathered suggesting an applicant holds extremist political or
religious beliefs unless the CFE committee finds evidence of this
from a separate source.
Third, if the bar discovers that more investigation of an
applicant’s social media account is necessary, then that party
should be notified of the committee’s intent to proceed. This would
protect the applicant’s due process rights by ensuring the applicant
time to review any relevant social media accounts in preparation
for a hearing with the CFE board.
V. CONCLUSION
As social media becomes increasingly popular among law
students, bar policies governing this type of activity will directly
impact how future lawyers use social media in order to protect
their professional futures. Florida’s policy of considering social
media accounts is the first of its kind and may offer guidance to
other bar organizations in drafting their own rules. Past Supreme
Court cases also provide some guidance on policies that will be
constitutional and those that will not. Applicants’ constitutional
rights will best be protected by social media policies that specify
what the bar may not consider regardless of whether public or
private access is granted to the accounts. Bars should not consider
information that would infringe upon an applicant’s constitutional
rights.
47

In re Hale, in GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., SUSAN P. KONIAK, ROGER
CRAMTON, GEORGE M. COHEN, & W. BRADLEY WENDEl. THE LAW AND ETHICS
OF LAWYERING 1052 (5th ed. 2010).
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PRACTICE POINTERS


Practitioners, law school faculty, and other members of the
legal community should encourage their jurisdiction’s bar
organization to adopt and publish CFE standards.



Bar organizations should consider whether online
information gathered from both personal and limited-access
websites should be utilized in applicant CFEs. The bar
association should invite the local legal community to join
in this discussion.



Bar organizations that choose to consider information
gathered about applicants from their social media accounts
should specify what types of information may and may not
be utilized.

